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Abstract
This paper examines the distinction made by Arthur C. Danto
between artworks and what he terms "mere real things." It
presents an eighteenth-century tool for sifting grain (a riddle)
as a case study in the contexts of first, the house of its first
known owner, General Artemas Ward (1727-1800); second, an
exhibitioin 2006-7 drawn from the contents of that house
pointedly held in an art museum; and, third, the likely maker
of the object, a member of Hassanimisco Band of Nipmuc
Indians. It examines the equivocal position of objects such as
this in Danto's estimation, things that he considers to be
"under contest," and asks whether the distinction between
artworks and mere real things has any pertinence when
artifacts can be used or regarded so variously in the course of
their existence, whether as tools, symbols, artworks, or living
beings.
Key Words
archaeology, artifact, artwork, basketry, convention,
cosmogony, Danto, history, museum, symbol, tool
Work of art or mere real thing? Following Arthur Danto's lead
in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, this is a question
we might ask of an object made of strips of wood, three-and-
a-quarter inch deep, bent into a circle just over two feet in
diameter with a course mesh of interwoven wood splints. It is
an agricultural implement, a tool for sifting grain known as a
riddle. It bears a stamp on its side, "AW" for Artemas Ward,
the eighteenth-century militia officer, judge, and gentleman
farmer from whose house in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts it
comes. It was included in an exhibition, "'A Public Patriotic
Museum': Artworks and Artifacts from the Artemas Ward
House," at the Fogg Art Museum, Harvard University (October
14, 2006-February 11, 2007).[1]
Danto might term it an artifact, a human-made mere real
thing. My collaborator, Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, and I contrived
its display to invite attention to its aesthetic characteristics by
showing it like a piece of sculpture, vertical in a case; but if we
follow Danto, it remains on the face of it part of the Prose of
the World, and not of Absolute Spirit, to use Hegel's terms
cited by Danto.[2] For Danto such a thing is not and never can
be an artwork. It does not compare or compete with
philosophy in the articulation of ideas. It is not about anything.
In The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, Danto argues that
there is a strict boundary between artworks and mere real
things. In his later discussion of African art, he carefully makes
a case for extending this principle beyond the modern Euro-
American art world with which he is so deeply familiar. He
acknowledges that art can be produced within any society; yet
he acknowledges that some material remains contested, so
how important is it to decide what is art and what is not?
With this in mind, Ulrich and I pointedly held the exhibition in
which the riddle appeared in an art museum. It concerns
General Artemas Ward, the first commander in the opening
months of the War of Independence in 1775 of what was to
become the Continental Army. Following his death in 1800,
successive generations of his family remained in his house in
Shrewsbury until a descendent bequeathed it to Harvard in
1925 as a memorial museum. Ward's female descendents
were the ones who sought to preserve his memory by keeping
and eventually labeling his personal possessions: books and
inkwell, even his razor and strop, all treated with the gravity
of relics. Their own handwork, transmitted from mother to
daughter or aunt to niece, became in turn relics of their own
efforts of commemoration. This transmission reveals an
alternative genealogy: one of sentiment following female lines
of descent that complements that of real property and
masculine public reputation entrusted to male primogeniture.
By juxtaposing relics associated with Artemas Ward with the
more private productions of his female descendents, Ulrich
and I hoped to bring that female genealogy of sentiment out
from beneath Ward's shadow and to reveal an aspect of
women's roles in the creation of family, local, and even
national mythology. We also hoped to show that aesthetic
considerations played an important role in the decisions
women—and others—made.[3]
The objects we selected were varied. They included artifacts
that none would gainsay as artworks, such as Raphaelle
Peale's 1793 oil portrait of Artemas Ward,[4] and objects that
could enjoy a place within an art museum's decorative arts
collection, such as General Ward's Windsor writing chair.[5]
Costume, too, has long been included among the decorative
arts, so General Ward's cloak is fully qualified for exhibition in
an art museum—as are the two quilts we chose.[6] Quilts,
though, continue to occupy an equivocal position, and some
might seek to relegate them to the realm of craft or of
amateur work along with a family register in the form of a
hair-work flower bouquet.[7] Other objects, like Artemas
Ward's snowshoes, may be no one's works of art, but rather
purely functional artifacts.[8] While some of these may at first
glance not qualify as art, and, admittedly, by Danto's criteria
perhaps never qualify as art, others are clearly what he
describes when mentioning "wrought-iron work from medieval
Spain, for example, or swords and halberds from Nuremberg"
as "under contest."[9] Although such things are to be found in
many European and North American art museums, according
to Danto they "may forever be but high-class artifacts";[10]
"may" sounding an honest note of equivocation. Before
exploring why such equivocation is fully warranted, let us look
at the uses to which historians put material objects.
While most historians set the greatest store by written
documents, few would disagree that any object with a past
might disclose aspects of that past, if they could but discover
adequate means of addressing it. Material objects, then, have
a role to play in the writing of history. One of the great values
of The Transfiguration of the Commonplace is that Danto
demonstrates with great clarity and wit that artworks, at least,
have immaterial as well as material constituents. Historians
should take both into account if they are to succeed in
interpreting material objects adequately.
Archaeology has become increasingly important to historians
who study eras and areas affected by a paucity of
documentation. Equally importantly, archaeological research
has radically complemented and revised accounts of societies
with rich written records.[11] The early history of colonial
North America is a striking example.[12] The incorporation of
archaeological information within history as an important
modifier and complement has strengthened a radical change in
the conception of cultures. Whereas until recently many
believed that cultures without writing were necessarily cultures
without history, the successful exploitation of material remains
(and, of equal importance, oral tradition) has encouraged
recognition that all peoples have histories, regardless of their
technologies. Just as an increased mingling of history and
archaeology has helped to prompt this conceptual change, so
has an equally far-reaching mingling of history and
anthropology. Epistemological and technological change may
occur at different rates in different societies and at rates that
vary over time within any society, but the human past is never
static. All peoples have pasts, and all pasts entail change;
therefore all peoples can have histories, if only historians could
find the source material and persuasive means of using it to
make those histories.
This release from a view that allowed historical initiative only
to some self-proclaimed high cultures while withholding it from
others can be viewed as part of a postcolonial epistemic shift.
It means that peoples previously denied even the possibility of
histories within the terms of the dominant culture can see their
claims upon their pasts accepted, or at least acquiesced in,
within those terms. (However, this is not to claim that there
are no radical disagreements over interpretation.) This
development has had a momentous effect on the study of vast
areas and chronologies and led to detailed reassessments of
relations in recent centuries between colonized peoples and
colonizers. For example, combinations of archaeological,
ethnological, and folkloric studies of material objects, in
conjunction with closer attention than had previously been
given to aspects of documents and other texts, has led to a
recognition within the dominant culture that Native Americans
are as possessed of histories as are the colonists who
decimated, displaced, and confined them.[13]
The use of material objects by historians is not confined to the
archaeological record. They can appeal to objects otherwise
studied in terms of anthropology, folklore, antiquarianism, and
art history. What matters, in broad terms, do historians
address by considering such things? The matters at issue are
human beings' changing relationships with things themselves
through making and use, and with one another by means of
the things they make and use. The range of material is wide
indeed. Defining it entails making taxonomic distinctions.
In the first instance, we can distinguish between things
considered within Western culture to be material alone in the
sense of being independent of human design—broadly
speaking, nature—and things that have both material and
immaterial components in terms of human design, which are
things in culture. These correspond, though not necessarily
without qualification, to the natural and the artificial, things in
nature and things in culture. The distinction between what can
be said to lie within the realm of human artifice and what
remains in nature is far from clear-cut, as human intervention
in nature takes many forms.[14] In an era of genetic
engineering and the patenting of life forms, we may wonder
whether we can still justifiably isolate what is wholly human-
made and artificial, but let us attempt to do so, even though
such things may be defined by no clear boundary, and term
things fashioned by, or designated and modified by human
agency, artifacts.
Artifacts are very varied. They range from objects considered
by many to be among the most sophisticated and culturally
valuable artworks that represent human thought at its most
profound to the smallest everyday thing,: from paintings by
Poussin to pincushions. That this range seems so great itself
implies a number of questions for historians who would
address objects that fall within it.
When in pursuit of profound and subtle human thinking, the
claims of artworks might appear to be self-evident, however
varied the range of human thought they represent culturally
and chronologically. We readily acknowledge that an artwork is
an embodiment or expression of complex abstract thinking,
partly, perhaps, original to the artist, but comprehensible to a
greater or lesser extent by the artist's contemporaries owing
to adherence to a shared set of conventions. A tendency
persists among Westerners to acknowledge this as applying
less problematically to artworks culturally familiar to them
than to others. Nonetheless, few would seriously claim that a
thirteenth-century Indian bronze statue of Rama expounds
complex religious ideas any less sophisticatedly than does a
contemporary Sienese gable sculpture of Christ Blessing. Both
are products of societies that until not long ago were among
those described as civilizations to distinguish them from others
regarded by Westerners, and some others, as of lesser worth.
Many now would be embarrassed to claim that either of these
objects is any more culturally sophisticated than the products
of what were once seen as inferior cultures. For example, few
would claim that a granary door from the Dogon people in Mali
or a Chilkat blanket from the Tlingit people of the Pacific
North-West represent abstract ideas any less complex than the
Indian statue or the Sienese sculpture. All such things, from
whatever society or time, that embody or express ideas—or
"aboutness" in Danto's formulation—even if that aboutness
concerns the object's own form or status, are amenable to
being treated as artworks.
As we have seen, Danto draws a distinction between artworks,
which possess aboutness, and "mere real things," which, while
also artifacts, do not.[15] This is not to claim that aboutness is
the criterion according to which one can invariably distinguish
artworks from other artifacts. The objects in the Ward
exhibition no less than my four further examples, though,
suggest that any boundary between artworks and other
artifacts is likely to be porous. The Ward examples being, on
the face of it, Western suggest that this porosity is not an
effect of cultural diversity. All the objects I have mentioned
have a non-art use: the Peale portrait of Ward promotes his
social status; the hair-work register places fragments of family
members in demonstrative relation to one another; the Rama
and the Christ serve as devotional objects; the Dogon door is
both a practical fixture and an intermediary between the
material and immaterial worlds; and the Chilkat blanket is
similarly a ritual mediator. To use a thing as an artwork
(allowing this to be an expression to which Danto might
object, for to him a thing either is or is not an artwork) does
not preclude using it in other manners too, though some or
even all of those other uses—commemoration, devotion, ritual,
boundary definition—may draw upon those qualities that also
qualify that thing for use as an artwork; that is, the aesthetic
qualities of an object can enhance its efficacy in the variety of
uses to which it is put.
Danto points out that the degree of detachment supposed by
Immanuel Kant's criteria of disinterest and purposiveness
without purpose for the artwork only obtains in special periods
of art history (and, we should add, in certain cultures).[16] He
also argues that it is possible to "suspend practicality, to stand
back and assume a detached view of the object, see its
shapes and colors, enjoy and admire it for what it is,
subtracting all considerations of utility."[17] That is, any object
can be used as an artwork, but so doing does not in itself
make it one. As he puts it, "it is possible to see the whole
world across aesthetic distance . . . [b]ut just for this reason
we cannot explicate the connection between artworks and
reality on the basis of this distinction" (original emphasis).[18]
The consequence of these observations and of a desire not to
limit aesthetic attention to artworks produced as such within
certain cultures during limited periods might lead some to set
aside as impracticable any ambition to define art
comprehensively and to prefer the possible errors and
absurdities that follow from regarding and using any object
aesthetically. Even if some, like me, choose this course,
nonetheless, insofar as we continue to draw a distinction in
practice between artworks as such and Danto's mere real
things, we should be grateful to Danto for helping us to
recognize that we can choose otherwise. That is, we could
choose to describe the artwork as the product of more or less
profound abstract thinking which careful perusal or scholarly
explication can reveal, in contradistinction to the mere real
thing that, while perhaps the product of considerable
ingenuity, neither embodies nor expresses profound qualities
or the inventiveness of its maker.
On this view, the everyday object is the lesser thing and, by
implication, should be excluded as far as possible from
institutions such as art museums in favor of artworks. We
would do this by distinguishing between artworks and mere
real things by first, seeking to account for the conventions
according to which they first operated—the embodiment or
expression of abstract ideas and values recognizable by both
makers and initial users—in both categories. The mere real
thing is exhausted once the observer has identified conformity
to these conventions. The artwork, on the other hand,
manifests what we might term a surplus; that is,
characteristics that are the result of the maker's calculated
modification or even pointed flouting of those conventions.
These can be material or immaterial (for instance, an act of
titling), but in either case the surplus—the art—consists in the
purposive deviation from an initial user's expectations.
Western thought has long valued this characteristic as
originality, but other cultures, however conservative in their
adherence to familiar forms, similarly value highly subtle
manifestations of adaptability and modification, though not
necessarily with the same emphasis on solipsism that
characterizes the Western attitude. The artwork, then, has
qualities that cause it to be unique in this sense of deviation
from a norm within a set of conventions, as opposed to being
no more than an articulation of such a set of conventions, and
therefore simply representative of them.
Yet we should pause to consider those highly subtle
manifestations of adaptability and modification that might
characterize some non-Western (and even some Western)
things. Is this a consideration confined to artworks? Do sets of
conventions governing the ideas associated with artifacts that
are not artworks remain unchanging? Are they not subject to
inventive modification no less than is manifest in
acknowledged artworks? May not those changes be either less
recognizable to Western eyes and minds than those in
acknowledged artworks, or incremental in subtle ways? We
should recall with some urgency that, as the anthropologist
Germaine Dieterlen long ago observed, "The smallest everyday
object may reveal in its form or decoration a conscious
reflection of a complex cosmogony."[19] An artifact can
purposefully have a place in a system of thought familiar to its
maker and early users to which even a relatively careful
observer may be oblivious, whether through inattention to the
possible significance of its material characteristics or ignorance
of its immaterial associations for its original constituency.
Furthermore, the smallest everyday object can also embody or
reveal the traces of certain of that constituency's assumptions
that are not purposefully articulated by its maker, but that
reveal themselves in inadvertent traces of use that imply
routines of everyday life constitutive, as Michel de Certeau
argued, of cultural values.[20] Such routines can leave their
inadvertent traces on artifacts themselves, such as patterns of
wear: the abrasion of the abrasion of the foot of Daniel
Chester French's statue of John Harvard in Harvard yard where
visitors repeatedly touch it, like pilgrims who kiss the statue of
St. Peter Enthroned in his Roman basilica.
In many instances when archaeology is the principle means of
investigation, the corollary evidence of contemporary
testimony that might explain both deliberate and inadvertent
characteristics simply does not exist. Sometimes analogies can
be drawn by comparison with related, often later, material.
Thus, in order to account for the incised of dots and lines on
the edges of a nineteenth-century antler awl handle excavated
at a Wahpeton Dakota village in Minnesota, archaeologist Janet
Spector appealed to oral information concerning the
conventions according to which women kept count of the hides
and tipis they had prepared by a tally system on their hide-
working tools.[21] Furthermore, although these marks may
appear to be purely functional, we should not assume as much
without due cause; rather we should at least consider the
possibility that they may approach or conform to the kind of
marks to which we saw Dieterlen drawing attention as "a
conscious reflection of a complex cosmogony." Furthermore,
this occurrence was not a natural phenomenon, but a cultural
contrivance with a history, could we but discover it. Someone
invented the notation, and its mode and significance may have
changed deliberately over time.
That an artifact is "a conscious reflection of a complex
cosmogony" is not sufficient for it to be an artwork in Danto's
sense, though for the historian this would seem to be one of
its most interesting and useful possible qualities. We are not
always in a position readily to recognize those immaterial
constituents that might have led such a thing to be what it
was to its makers and first users. Sometimes makers and first
users can be at cross purposes. Take Artemas Ward's riddle.
On the face of it this ordinary tool is part of the Prose of the
World. In part to stress the role that aesthetic response can
play in historical scholarship, we have contrived to present it in
terms Danto describes so well when he argues that we can
choose to regard anything from an aesthetic viewpoint.[22]
Regardless of the aestheticizing effect of museum placement
and lighting, the grain riddle is an object of considerable
formal beauty, and struck Laurel Ulrich and me as such when
we came across it among many other mere real things at the
Ward house. This might be enough to warrant the treatment
we gave it in the exhibition, yet the case is more complex. It
may have been an unremarkable tool to Artemas Ward and his
farm workers in the mid-eighteenth century; but, like his
snowshoes, it was in all likelihood made by a member of a
local band of Hassanamisco Indians with which Ward had an
administrative relationship.[23] Indian basketry, of which this
riddle is likely an easily overlooked example, rarely simply
serves a practical function; its materials and mode of making
usually carry cosmological associations so that such an object
most likely epitomized aspects of its maker's ideas about the
world. While an object made by an Indian for white people's
use may not be so profoundly imbued with the quality of a
living being as one made for and used by an indigenous
community, it can nonetheless partake of that quality.[24]
The riddle of the riddle therefore, is far more complex than we
might initially have supposed. I, for one, propose to respect
its complexity, its propensity to be more than one thing: tool
and symbol, and, for all I know, artwork and living being. No
object reveals all of itself in any one circumstance, and the
changes among its aspects are a matter of history.
The historian Randolph Starn makes the point that "all
museums are in some sense historical."[25] This is indeed a
key aspect of their interest and utility. However, there would
seem to be at least two further reasons to be interested in
them. First, they propose taxonomies of the world, hence are
philosophical instruments; and second, they allow or in some
cases encourage aesthetic engagement with their contents. To
my way of thinking, philosophical, aesthetic, and historical
engagement are inseparably complementary. This is why I
attend to and greatly value Arthur Danto's arguments in The
Transfiguration of the Commonplace regarding the peculiarity
of artworks. There are good reasons always to acknowledge
first, the character of our taxonomies of objects, and second,
our propensity to make aesthetic judgments about all those
things from which we would make history. As one of the
proverbial sayings inscribed on the quilt by its maker, Artemas
Ward's granddaughter, Sarah Putnam, has it: "Where you
can't unriddle learn to trust."[26]
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